Trusted Computing is Chasing Yesterday's Problems

Earlier this week I was able to stop by the CSI 2008 conference. I was only able to take in a couple of the presentations, including a keynote by Steve Hanna, a Distinguished Engineer at Juniper Networks. Steve was speaking about trusted computing, explaining what it is and how it will tackle some of the security problems that we face. Now I'll confess that I've never been completely sold on the concept of trusted computing. I've tended to view it as somewhat of an ivory tower initiative that might work fine in a structured, high-security environment such as a DoD network, but not overly practical for the 'real world'. That said, Steve made some strong points about the value of Trusted computing and argued that it's closer to becoming a mainstream reality than I'd realized.

Steve detailed three primary layers for his vision of Trusted computing:

1. Trusted hardware - The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) has a unique, secret RSA key burned into it at the time of manufacture and can be used for hardware identification. The TPM specification was developed by the Trusted Computing Group and many chip manufacturers have included a TPM in laptop chip sets since 2006.
2. Tusted Operating System - Projects such as the NSA High Assurance Platform Program seek to leverage the TPM to create the foundation of a secure operating system.
3. Network Access Control - Protecting access to resources or network.

Now I can envision how such a system, if implemented could go a long way towards limiting the spread of malicious code by ensuring that untrusted binaries are simply not permitted to execute on a given system. The problem with such an approach is that it works in opposition to the open nature of the Internet, a principal that we've come to know and love. Would users be willing to be restricted in the applications that can be run on their machines? I don't think so. In general we're willing to accept security risks in favor of an open architecture that allows flexibility. For proof, look no further than the cell phone industry. Cell phones were once inflexible boxes that ran specific applications and if you didn't like it, you could buy another phone. Today however, Telecoms are tripping over one another to show just how open they are and how they welcome third party applications. Will this break down barriers for mobile malicious code? Sure, but consumers don't care. They want flexibility.

My second concern with the vision for trusted computing is that it will do little to prevent web based attacks which don't require binary code execution and threats of this nature will only continue to grow. Take Clickjacking for example. This is really a social engineering attack. You are convincing someone to perform an action which they did not intend to do, because you are able to manipulate the look and feel of the page that they're viewing. Cross Site Request Forgery is another great example. Once again, the attack leverages web functionality as it was designed. No binary execution is required.

After listening to Steve's keynote, I have a better understanding and appreciation for trusted computing. However, I'm more convinced than ever that it's focused on yesterday's attacks, while we as an industry need to be looking to tomorrow.

- michael